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Expanding  wage differentials during adjustment imposes  a
greater  burden on  the poorest workers, making adjustment
policies less sustainable politically. And nominal devaluation is
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Implicit in standard macroeconomics of adjust-  examine the effect of devaluation on relative
ment is the assumption of well-integrated labor  wages in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and
markets that are responsive to relative prices.  Uruguay.
But segmentation of the labor market is  They found that formal wages are more
usually said to be an important source of labor  responsive than informal wages to inflation and
market rigidities.  In particular, if segmentation  that devaluation of the exchange rate, by in-
involves different degrees of real wage rigidity  creasing the wage gap, is a source of sluggish
among different groups in the labor force,  labor mobility.
nominal devaluation may be ineffective and
inequitable in its impact.  They also found that expanding wage differ-
entials during adjustment imposes a greater
Lopez and Riveros use a model of labor  burden on the poorest workers, making adjust-
market segmentation in which regulations are  ment policies less polihcally sustainable.
necessary to distinguish between the formal and
informal sectors.  In addition, they found evidence to support
the hypothesis that nominal devaluation would
Using standard econometric techniques to  probably be ineffective with a segmented labor
estimate four simultaneous equations, they  market.
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Macroeconomic  adjustment  typically  relies  on  policies  involving
devaluations  of the  ezchange  rate  to transfer  productive  resources  from  non-
tradable  to tradable  industries.  For  a  nominal  devaluation  to succeed  in  real
terms  --  i.e.,  achieving  a real  devaluation  in  terms  of  a permanent  change  in
the  relative  price  of tradable  to  non-tradable  goods  --  use  of expenditure
reduction  policies  and  existence  of  wage flexibllity  and  labor  mobility  are
deemed  necesaary. This  indicates  the  importance  of the  labor  market  structure
as a factor  determining  the  effectiveness  of the  macroeconomic  policy.
The  standard  macroeconomics  of  adjustment  critically  hinges  on  the
assumption  of efficient  and  well integrated  labor  markets,  which  are
responsive  to relative  prices. However,  an already  vast literature  has
provided  evidence  in  support  of  the  existence  of  segmented  labor  markets
(SLMs)  in  LDCs,  and  suggested  that  segmentation  create  rigiditles  in  the
employment  and  wage  response  to  the  macro  policy  [PREALC/ILO (1985)11.
Segmentation  may  involve  different  degrees  of  real  wage  rigidity  across  labor
force  groups,  increase  the  formal/informal  wage  differential  during  the
adjustment,  reduce  labor  mobility  and  harm  the  political  sustainability  of  the
macroeconomic  policy.  In  short,  a  segmented  labor  market  may  cause  nominal
devaluations  to  be  relatively  ineffective  in  reaching  a  real  devaluation,  an
important  factor  in  explaining  incomplete  structural  adjustment.
If  a  devaluation  increases  the  formal/informal  wage  gap  then  the  burden
of  the  adjustment  would  be  carried  mostly  by  the  poorest  segments  of  the  labor
force.  This  tends  to  support  the  idea  that  adjustment  programs  are
distributionally  unfair.  However,  in  the  framework  of  the  SLMs theory  no  a-
priori  prediction  on  the  effect  of  adjustment  policies  on  the  formal/informal
For  a  discussion  on  the  issue,  see  Lopez  &  Riveros  (1989)2
wage gap  is  possible. That  effect  would  depend  upon  the  wage  elasticities,
other  parameters  linked  to  market  intervention  and  the  extent  of the
segmentation  problem  (Lopez  &  Riveros,  1989). For  instance,  the  formal/
informal  wage gap  may  be expected  to increase  if  wage indexation  prevails  in
the  formal  sector  while  fully  flexible  wages  exist  in the  informal  sector.
Hence,  the  actual  effect  of exchange  rate  policies  on the  formallinformal  wage
differential  is  an empirical  issue  which  requires  a  model  allowing  for
simultaneous  determination  of aggregate  expenditures  and  wages.
In this  paper  we use  a  model  that  allows  for  segmentation  in the  labor
market. The  role  of government  intervention  is  crucial  in distinguishing
protected  and  unprotected  segments  of the  labor  market  which  are,  in turn,
related  to the  traditional  taxonomy  of formal/  informal  sectors. The  model
concentrates  on the  effect  of  devaluation  on relative  wages  and  on the
existing  linkages  among  real  wages,  prices  and  aggregate  expenditures.  We
apply  standard  econometric  techniques  to  estimate  four  simultaneous  equations
which  connect  wages  in  the  formal  and  the  informal  sectors,  the  price  of  non-
tradables,  and  aggregate  expenditures  to  a set  of  policy  variables,  such  as
the  exchange  rate,  minimum  wages  and  non-wage  costs  of labor. The  analysis  is
applied  to four  Latin  American  countries  (Argentina,  Colombia.  Chile  and
Uruguay)  which  are  apparently  subject  to labor  market  segmentation  and  where
important  structural  adjustment  programs  have recently  been implemented.  In
general,  our  results  are  indicative  of the  importance  of segmentation  in
connection  with exchange  rate  policies. In  particular,  we found  that  formal
wages  are  more responsive  to inflation  and  that  exchange  rate  devaluations
increase  the  wage gap,  thus  being  a source  of poor  labor  mobility.
The  paper  is  organized  as follows:  In the  second  section  we review  the3
standard  theory  connecting  labor  market  structure  and  the  potential  effect  of
macroeconomic  adjustment  policies. A model  that  allows  for  simultaneous
determination  of  wages,  prices  and  income  under  the  hypothesis  of segmented
labor  markets  is discussed. In the  third  section  we cover  the  empirical
version  of the  model  and  we examine  general  economic  information  concerning
the  countrles  included  in  the  study. In the  fourth  section  we present  the
empirical  estimates  of the  multi-equation  model. Finally,  in  section  five  we
include  a brief  summary  and  discuss  some  policy  implications.
2.  Labor Market  Segmentation  and Adjustent.
2.1.  The  Issue
At the  beginning  of the  19809  most  LDCs faced  unsustainable  trade
deficits  and  severe  internal  macroeconomic  imbalances.  The situation  prompted
profound  adjustments  in  which  nominal  devaluations  and  expenditure  reduction
occupied  a  central  role.  Comparative  cross-country  studies  have  revealed  that
deregulation  of internal  markets  is a  crucial  factor  in  explaining  the  varying
degree  of success  of  LDCs in  responding  to  macroeconomic  policies  (Corbo  &
Sturzenegger,  1988). This  finding  suggests  that  deregulation  of the  labor
market  would  also  be a  key factor  in improving  the  supply  response  to
macroeconomic  adjustment  policies.
The  recent  adjustment  experience  in  LDCs  indicates  that  poor inter-
sectoral  labor  mobility  in  urban  areas  is  a relatively  common  problem  (Fallon
& Riveros,  1989). The  negative  effect  of industry-specific  human  capital  on
labor  mobility  (Katz,  1986)  may  be a reasonable  explanation.  However,  the
existence  of relatively  high  geographical  labor  mobility  and  a  burdensome
system  of institutional  regulations  in  urban  labor  markets  (Fallon  & Riveros,4
1989)  strongly  suggests  that  labor  market  segmentation  may be a critical
factor  in  explaining  the  presence  of  higher  open  unemployment  under  adjustment
policies.  The  standard  macroeconomic  analysis  relies  upon  the  assumption  of
smooth  labor  markets,  in  which  labor  mobility  responds  to changes  in relative
wages (for  a review,  see  Corbo  et al (1988),  Edwards  (1988)]. Hence,
adjustment  policies  result  in  a  drop  in real  consumption  wages  across  the
board,  a drop  in  wages  in terms  of the  price  of tradables  and  in  a subsequent
reallocation  of labor  from  non-tradables  to the  tradable  sector. Analyses  of
wage indexation  and  minimum  wages  in the  context  of  macro  adjustment  have
usually  assumed  homogeneous  labor  markets  (Fischer(1984),  Lal (1985)1  or
partial  coverage  in  terms  of industries  [Edwards,  19881. Yet, the  issue  of
SLMs  has  not  been  explicitly  included  in  macroeconomic  analyses. Central
questions  in this  regard  are:  To  what  extent  is  a SLM  a factor  potentially
hindering  the  success  of stabilization-cum-structural  adjustment?;  What  are
the  relevant  links  between  effectiveness  of  nominal  devaluations  and  a SLM?;
What alternative  policies  may  be  used  to  make the  labor  market  more
responsive?.
2.2  The  Model
The  view  adopted  here is  that  segmentation  is  mainly  a result  of
government  intervention  and  regulations  that  benefit  only  part  of the  labor
force. The  protected  (formal)  sect  2  is formed  by large  firms,  covered  by
several  regulations  on  wages  and  employment 2. The  unprotected  (informal)
sector  is  characterized  by free  entry  and  by fully  flexible,  market-clearing
wages. Regulations  cannot  be enforced  in the  informal  sector  because  of the
2, This is the sector  where regulations  can actually  be enforced  by the
administrative  authority.  These  regulations  normally  include  non-wage  costs  of
labor,  wage indexation  rules,  job  security  and  minimum  wages.S
small  size  of the  average  firm. We assume  that  the fornml  sector  produces
both  tradables  and  non-tradable  goods  using  skilled  and  unskilled  labor,  while
the  informal  secto?  produces  only  non-tradable  goods  with  only  unskilled
labor 3.
The  wage rate  of skilled  labor  (Ws)  is determined  in  the  formal  sector.
Market  clearing  conditions  determine  a  competitive  Onotional^  wage (Ws*)  that
depends  upon  prices  of tradables  (Pt).  prices  of  non-tradables  (Pn)  and  the
minimum  wage (MW),  which  is the  wage actually  paid  to unskilled  labor  in the
formal  sector 4. The  effective  wage for  skilled  labor  is the  notional  wage
modified  by a distortionary  factor  (9  >1)  which  is related  to government  and
union  intervention 5. The  existence  of this  distortionary  factor  implies  that
a  portion  of  skilled  workers  may  remain  openly  unemployed.
The  demand  for  skilled  labor  is  derived  from  profit  maximization  and  the
usual  convexity  assumptions.  The  total  demand  for  skilled  labor  corresponds
to the  private  sector  demand  function  plus  public  sector  employment  (Lg),
3. The  concept  of skills  we use refers  to  both  general  and  specific  human
capital.  In the empirical  exercise  presented  below,  we employ  the concept  of
general  human  capital  (schooling).  The  basic  assumptions  of  this  model  reflect
the  tradition  of the  SLMs  approach,  according  to  which  the  informal  sector  is
mainly concentrated  in  services  (i.e. production  of non-tradables)  and
characterized  b7 relatively  low  labor  productivity.
4  We assume  the  law  of  one  price  such  that  the  domestic  price  of  tradables
is  equal  to ivternational  prices  multiplied  by the  nominal  exchange  rate.
5  In another  paper  (Lopez  & Riveros,  1989b)  we generalize  this  assumption
by postulating  that ln(ws)-  ln(w*)  + Ox[6 0 +  61 ln(w*)  +  62 ln(MW)I,  where  the
Ox*  indicates  the  product  between  0 and  the  term  between  brackets  represents  a
functional  form  for  the  distortionary  factor.  This  specification  implies  that
if  9 is  zero,  w-w*,  and  that  v is  increasing  in  w* and  0.6
which  is  assumed  esogenous 6. Naturally,  the  labor  deFand  depends  on  effective
rather  than  notional  wages:
Ds  - Ds(Vs,  HW, Pt,  Pn;  Kf)  +  Lg  (1]
_  ?  I  +  +
Where  Kf is  the  capital  stock  in  the  formal  sector  of the  economy.
The  supply  of skilled  workers  (Ss)  depends  upon  the  aggregate  CPI (p)
which  is,  in turn,  a  weighted  average  of tradable  and  non-tradable  prices. Ss
also  depends  upon  the  effective  wage rate (Ws)  because  individuals  value  the
benefits  associated  with prevailing  non-wage  costs 7.
Ss-  Ss(Ws,  p, N)  (2]
4.  - +
where  N is  working  age  population.
Both  the  labor  demand  and  supply  are  homogeneous  degree  zero  in  wages
and  prices. The  notional  equilibrium  wage is the  wage rate  that  would  prevail
in absence  of unemployment  of skilled  workers. Thus,  this  notional  wage rate
is obtained  by equating  (1]  and (23:
Ws*  . Ws*(Pt,  Pn,  MW,  Kf,  Lg,  N)  (33
+  +  ?  +  +  -
6  An alternative  is to consider  public  sector  employment  to depend  upon
the  operational  public  sector  deficit.  This  would  allow  us to account  for  the
effect  of fiscal  measures  usually included  in adjustment  programs.  We will
introduce  the  role  of fiscal  expenditures  on the  demand  side  of the  model,  thus
affecting  prices  and,  indirectly,  employment  and  wages.
7.  Non-wage  costs  are  associated  with  outlays  represented  by  things  fringe
benefits,  social  security,  vacations  days,  etc.,  whose  benefits  always  accrue
to the  worker.7
The  relationship  between  notional  and actual  wages  ii.
Ws - OWe*  G>1  [43
O  is  related  to  both  government  and  union  intervention  in  wage setting. We
can represent  a  dynamic  version  of [43  in  which  thn  policy  parameter  9  is
linearly  linked  to  a variable  B --  representing  government  intervention  in  the
form  of  non-wvge  costs  of labor  --  and  a  variable  (Pt-Pet,t-l)  which  intends
to  capture  ex-post  wage indexation,  where  POt,t-l  is the  price  level  in  period
t-l  to  obtain  in  period  t  (Fischer,  1984)8. Existence  of the  factor  0 is
likely  to  produce  open  unemployment  among  skilled  workers.
The  wage rate  for  unskilled  labor  varies  across  the  formal  and  informal
sectors. We assume  that  the  minimum  wage (MW)  is  binding  for  unskilled  labor
used  in the  formal  sector  (Luf) 9. In the  informal  sector  the  equilibrium  wage
(Wu)  is  determined  by supply  and  demand. Both  the  supply  (Su)  and  the  demand
(Dui)  of unskilled  labor  in the  informal  market  are  homogeneous  degree  zero  in
wages  and  prices. The  relationship  besween  the  formal  and  the  informal
segment  in  the  market  of  unskilled  labor  follows  Harberger  (1972):  given  the
formal  sector  demand  for  unskilled  labor  and  the  prevailing  MW. there  is  an
effective  labor  supply  to the  informal  sector  (S*). The  market  equilibrium
between  the  prevailing  labor  demand  (Dui)  and  the  effective  labor  supply  to
8.  Thus,  proportional  changes  in  0 (  0)  may  be linearly  related  to  changes
in  government  intervention  (  B) and  in a variable  reflecting  indexation,  such
as  in:  0 - a +  b  B +  c(Pt_Ptet,t_l)  +  E,  where *El  is a random  term.  This
specification  will  be empirically  tested.
9.  Unskilled  labor  may  be  assumed  to  be  a  gross  substitute  of  skilled  labor
in  the  formal  sector.  Hence,  we  would  expect  a  positive  relationship  between
them.  However,  we  do  not  impose  any  a  priori  constraint  on the  sign of this
relationship.l
the  informal  sector  (Lu)  determines  the  informal  sector  equilibrium  wage  (Yfu).
S*  - Su(MV,  p, N)  (53
Dui  - Dui(Wu,  Pf,  Ki)  (63
In  considering  the  demand  for  unskilled  labor  in  the  fo  sector  (Duf),  and
by  also  assuming  that  the  market  represented  by  eqs. (51  and  (61  clears,  we
can  arrive  at  the  following  equilibrium  concitions
Dui  (Wu,  Pn,  Ki)  - (l  - Z)  S*(MW,  Pt,  Pn,  N)  (73
where  2-  Duf(MV,  Ws,  Pt,  Pn,  Kf)IS*CHM,  Pt,  Pn,  N),  is  the  proportion  of
unskilled  workers  that  are  able  to  find  a  job  in  the  formal  sector.  It  is
assumed  that  the  supply  of  unskilled  labor  depends  on  the  MW,  which  is  a  rate
prevailing  only  in  the  formal  sector.  Not  all  workers,  however,  are.able  to
find  a  job  at  the  going  MW  in  the  formal  sector.  A proportion  of  those  unable
to  find  a  job  in  the  formal  sector  are  willing  to  accept  the  lower  wage  which
exists  in  the  informal  sector.  The  rest  would  prefer  to  remain  in  the  market
waiting  for  a  vacancy  in  the  formal  sector.  This  is  the  segment  of  unskilled
labor  that  remains  as  quasi-voluntarily  unemployed.
The following  implicit  equation  reflects  the  equilibrium  (informal
sector)  wage  for  unskilled  labor:
Wu  - Wu(Ws,  NW,  Pt,  Pn,  K,  N)  (83
t  - 4.+  +  -9
The  function  Wu  is  homogeneous  degree  one  in  wagge  and  prices.
The  price  of  noL-tradables  is  determined  endogenously  through  demand-
supply  conditions.  The  supply  of  non-tradables  iso
Sn  - Sn(Pn,  Pt,  Wu,  MW,  Ws,  1)  (93
[93  is  homogeneous  degree  zero  in  prices  and  wages. The  demand  function  is
writen  as  follows:
Dn  - Dn(Pn,  Pt.  Yd)  +#G  (103
where  Yd  correspond  to  disposable  income,  G  is  government  expenditures  and  j
(O  < i  <  1)  is  the  proportion  of  government  expenditures  used  in  non-tro.aable
goods  and  services.  The  function  Dno)  is  homogeneous  degree  zero  in  prices
and  income.  The  following  expression  corresponds  to  the  equilibrium.price  of
non-tradable  goods  in  the  economy,  which  are  competitively  determined:
Pn  - Pn(Pt,  Wu,  Ws,  MW,  K,  G,  Yd)  [11]
+  4.  +  4.  _  +F  4
which  is  linearly  homogeneous  in  wages  and  the  price  of  tradables.
The  model  is  completed  with  an  output  equation,  which  basically  assumes
that  output  in  the  economy  is  supply  determined.  Although  this  simplification
allows  us  to  concentrate  the  analysis  in  labor  market  issues,  it  may
significantly  afrect  the  explanatory  power  of  the  model.  On  the  other  hand,
if  we  specify  additional  equations  in  connection  with  the  expenditure  and10
monetary  sectors  of the  economy, this  would  increase  the  complexity  of the
model  adding  little  to  clarify  the  key  relationships  in  connection  with labor
markets. Hence,  output  will  be simply  expressed  as the  sum  of the  value  added
in  tradable  and  non-.rsdable  industries,  thus  being  a function  ,of  prices,
wages  and  the  stock  of  capitals
Y - Y(Pn,  Pt,  MW,  Wu,  ws;  K)  (12]
This  function  is  homogeneous  degree  one  in  prices  and  wages.
2.3  The  Wc.rkina  of  the  Model1 o.
The  market  for  skilled  labor  is  graphed  in Panel  A  (Figure  1).  DL and
DN correspond  to the  demand  functions  for  skilled  labor  in  the  production  of
tradables  and  non-tradables,  respectively.  The  graph  assumes  a given  supply
of skilled  workers  ,,quivalent  to the  distance  OA.  Wages  are  expressed  in
terms  of the  price  of tradables. The  unemployment  of skilled  labor  for  an
effective  wage level  W, is  E-E'.  If there  were full  flexibility  of  wages 1l
a devaluation  would  &ause  a  drop  in  DN (to  DN')  and in  the  effective  wage
level  (from  W to  WI),  thus  implying  a shift  of labor  from  non-tradable  to
tradable  production  equal  to  L-L'.
10. Further  discussion  on the theoretical  properties  of this model is
presented  in Lopez  & Riveros  (1989).
11 Full  wage flexibility  mday  take  place  regardless  of whether  distortion
exists.  Wage  flexibility  in  this  context  implies  that  the  distortion  is  constant,
thus  preserving  the  wedge  between  market  clearing  and  actual  wages.11
The  unskilled  formal  market  is  depicted  in panel  B (Figure  1),  where  MW
is expressed  in terms  of tradables. Given  MW,  the  prevailing  demand  for
unskilled  labor  determines  the  employment  level  in Zhe  formal  sector  (Luf).
The  effect  of the  MW on the  demand  for  skilled  labor  is  a-priori  unknown,  its
effect  depending  on the  complementary  or substitution  links  existing  between
skilled  and  unskilled  labor  in the  formal  sector.
Panel  C in Figure  1 depicts  the  informal  segment  of the  labor  market.
Su shows  the  total  labor  supply  of unskilled  workers  as a function  of MW.  The
supply  of unskilled  labor  to the  informal  sector  (S*)  is  related  to Su
according  to the  prevailing  MW: for  any  given  level  of MW,  S* is  equal  to the
total  supply  Su less  the  prevailing  employment  of  unskilled  labor  in  the
formal  sector. The  equilibrium  wage in the  informal  sector  is  Wu,  and  the
quasi-voluntary  unemployment  is  equal  to (Lui  - Lui'). 12 Wu is  expressed  in
terms  of tradables;  thus,  a  devaluation  causes  a  drop in  Dui  to  Dui'  which,
for  a given  labor  supply,  implies  a decline  in the  equilibrium  wage  from  Wu to
Wu'13 .
Consider  the  effect  of  a nominal  devaluation  accompanied  by a fiscal/
monetary  policy  that  keeps  nominal  aggregate  demand  constant. If  both  Ws and
MW are fixed  in terms  of the  price  of tradables,  production  of tradables  (in
the  formal  sector)  would  remain  unchanged. Since  the  skilled  labor  demand
from  the  non-tradable  sector  (in  the  formal  market)  would  fall  due  to
12  Quasi-voluntary  unemployment  correspond  to  those  with  supply  price  below
the  MW but  above  the  prevailing  equilibrium  wage in  the  informal  sector.
13.  A nominal  devaluation  will also  cause  the  MW (in  terms  of tradables)
to  decline.  However,  the  employment  effect  of a  reduction  in  the  MW  will  depend
upon  labor  mobility  in  the  skilled  market.  Thus,  if  wages  are  more  rigid  in  this
market,  employment  of unskilled  labor  in the formal  sector  will go up to the
extent  that there is substitution  between  skilled  and unskilled  labor  thus
countering  the  negative  impact  of a  nominal  devaluation  on Wu.12
devaluation,  employment  of skilled  labor  in the  non-tradable  industry  would
also  decrease. Thus,  output  of  non-tradables  in  the  formal  sector  would  be
reduced. The  demand  for  unskilled  labor  from  tha  formal  sector  would  also
fall  due  to the  decline  in  production  of  non-tradables.  This,  in turn,  would
expand  the  effective  supply  of  unskilled  labor  to the  informal  sector. This
would  reinforce  the  decline  of  unskilled  wages  in  the  informal  sector,  whlch
results  from  the  drop  of labor  demand  in  the  informal  sector  due  to the
devaluation.  Quasi-voluntary  unemployment  of  unskilled  workers  would
necessarily  increase. In summary,  output  of tradables  remains  constant,
output  of  non-tradables  wlll fall  in  both  sectors,  real  wages  of unskilled
labor  decrease  (thus  increasing  the  formal/informal  wage gap)  and  unemployment
of both  skilled  and  unskilled  workers  would  increase. In this  case,  the
devaluation  is  completely  ineffective  and  contractionary.
In the  more realistic  case  where  formal  sector  wages (Ws  and  the  MW) are
indexed  to the  total  CPI  instead  of the  price  of tradables,  the  effect  of  a
devaluation  is,  of course,  less  contractionary  and  more effective  in  promoting
tradable  production.  If the  indexation  is  binding,  Vs  will fall  by less  than
what  would  be required  to  maintain  the  orlginal  level  of  unemployment.  Thus,
unemployment  among  the  skilled  would  increase. Output  of  non-tradables  would
still  fall  but,  output  of tradables  would  increase,  so  the levaluation  is less
contractionary.  The  demand  for  unskJlled  workers  from  the  formal  sector  would
still  decrease  (by  a lesser  extent),  but since  MW falls  it is  not  clear
whether  the  effective  supply  of unskilled  workers  to the  informal  sector  will
increase. However,  output  and  real  wages  in  the  informal  sector  will
decrease. In this  case,  all  qualitative  results  from  the  previous  analysis
stlll  hold,  although  the  quantitative  signLficance  is  milder.Figure  1  13
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Central  issues  for  the  empirical  analysis  are  the  response  of formal  and
informal  wages  to  a nominal  devaluation,  and  the  response  of the  price  of non-
tradables  to a  nominal  devaluation.  The  stickier  real  wages  are  in the  formal
sector,  the  more likely  a  nominal  devaluation  will  negatively  affect  real
wages  in  the  informal  sector  and  thwart  intersectoral  labor  mobility. In
contrast,  a smoothly  functioning  labor  market  would  produce  declining  wages  in
terms  of tradables  for  both  skilled  and  unskilled  labor,  thus  facilitating  the
transfer  of labor  across  industries.  Similarly,  the  larger  the  degree  of
distortion  in the  formal  sector,  and  thus  the  lower  the  response  of labor
markets  to  macro  policies,  the more ineffective  a  nominal  devaluation  would
be in  achieving  a change  in the  relative  price  of tradables  to  non-tradables.
3.  Empirical  Analysis  of  Labor  Market  Segmentation
3.1  The  Econometric  Model.
The  model  discussed  above  originates  four  estimating  equations:  wages
for  skilled  (Ws)  and  for  unskilled  (Wu)  labor;  price  of  non-tradableq  (Pn)  and
aggregate  income  (Y). The two  former  will be referred  as formal  and informal
wages,  respectively.  The  structural  empirical  system  is the  following:
Ws - aO +  aiB + a2Pt +  3Pn +  a4Hw +  a5K +  a6Lg +  a7N + V1
Wu - B0 +  BlPt +  22Ws +  B3Pn +  B4HW +  B5K +  26 N +  V2
Pn - ro  +  rPt +  r 2Wu +  r3Ws +  1r 4HW + r5K  +  r6Yd + 'r 7G +  V3
Y  - 60 + 6 1 Pt  + 62Pn  + 63Ws  + 64Wu +  65 HW  + 66K  + V4
Where  Vi (i-l..4)  are  random  terms  with zero  mean and  constant
variancel 4; B is the  ratio  of  non-wage  costs  of labor  to  wages  --  which  we use
14  There  are  not restrictions  on the  matrix  of  variances  and  covariances
of  the  system,  as there  may  be correlation  between  the  errors  pertaining  to any
pair  of equations.15
as  a  proxy  for  015.,  K  is  the  aggregate  capital  stock,  which  we  used  instead
of  the  sectoral  capital  stock.  The  model  will  be  estimated  with  2SLS  and
3SLS,  thus  also  accounting  for  correlation  among  the  error  terms  Vi. The
variables  will  be  expressed  in  rates  of  change,  so  that  the  parameters  are
interpreted  as  elasticitiee) 6. The  reduced  form  will  provide  estimates  of  the
"total"  effect  of  changes  in  exogenous  variables,  thus  complementing  the
information  given  by  the  estimated  structural  parameters 17.
The  system  displayed  by  the  four  empirical  equations  corresponds  to  the
*equilibrium*  form  of  the  model  --  i.e.  indicating  equilibrium  prices.  We  do
not  impose  any  constraint  with  regard  to  the  structural  underlying  equations,
nor  will  we  attempt  to  recover  their  structural  parameters.  The  estimates  of
these  four  equations  are  deemed  enough  to  test  the  empirical  adequacy  of  the
model  and  the  effect  of  nominal  devaluations  on  wages  and  the  price  of  non-
tradables.  From  the  empirical  viewpoint  this  is  the  most  viable  alternative
given  the  existence  of  more  reliable  and  comparable  data  on  wages  than  nn
employment  of  skilled  and  unskilled  labor.
The  equations  of  the  structural  form  are  either  exactly  identified  or
overidentified  according  to  the  order  conditions.  Besides  the  exogenoius
variables  included,  instrumental  variables  (inflation,  money  stock,  niominal
exchange  rates,  taxation,  terms  of  trade)  was  also  used  in  the  estimation  of
the  model.  The  choice  of  instruments  was  limited  to  the  availability  of
15.  In  the  empirical  estimation  we  also  included  a  variable  reflecting  ex-
post  cpi  indexation.
16.  Thus,  the  change  in  capital  stock  is  simply  the  aggregate  investment.
17.  The reduced  form  system  is derived  from  the  specification  of the
structural  set  of  equations  presented  above.  In  the  empirical  part  we  introduce
some  changes  in  this  specification.16
comparable  information  in  a  time  series  form. Lags  were also  used in
estimating  several  versions  of the  model,  as for  instance  with regard  to the
role  played  by the  price  of tradables  and  the  investment  in  the  model.  Some
revisions  of this  general  structure  were effected  according  to  the  needs  of
the  empirical  analysis,  so  there  are  some  deviations  from  the  general
specification.
In the  above  discussion  of the  model  we defined  certain  restrictions
with regard  to the  structural  parameters.  These  restrictions  are  reproduced
below,  and they  will  be empirically  testedl8:
42  + a3 + a4 - I  s  31 +  32 + B3 +  B4 - 1;
+ r2 + 3  +  4  -1;  61 + 62  + 63 +  64 +  65
3.2  The  Case  Studies
The  countries  included  in this  study  (Argentina,  Colombia,  Chile  and
Uruguay)  are  at relatively  similar  development  stages. This  is  suggested  by
similar  life  expectancy  at birth  and  enrollment  ratios  in  primary  school
(Table  1).  The share  of  manufacturing  GDP  in  total  GDP  --  a rough  indicator
of the  importance  of the  modern  sector  in the  economy  --  also looks  alike.
The  per  capita  GDP,  however,  displays  a  higher  dispersion,  probably  due  more
to  periods  of over  and  undervaluation  of the  dollar  than  to key  economic
differences 1 g.
18.  The  procedure  will be to  estimate  the  model  without  any  constraint  on
the  coefficients  in each  of the  equations.  We will then  estimate  a restricted
form,  thus  statistically  testing  the  validity  of the  homogeneity  conditions.
19  For instance,  the  dollar  level  of per  capita  GDP  prevailing  in  1985
indicates  that  the  four  countries  are  at a  very  similar  development  stage.17
Table  I
Social  and  Economic  indicators  for  the  Chosen  Countries
1970  1980  1985
Arg  Col  Chi  Uru  Arg  Col  Chi  uru  Arg  Col  Chi  Uru
(l)  910  340  850  980  1960  1120 2100 2810  2120 1320  1440  1670
(2)  66.6  58.9  62.2  68.7  69.2  62.9  68.7  71.3  70.3  64.9  70.4  72.2
(3)  105  108  107  112  106  128  117  106  108  117  109  110
(4)  94.3  85.8  101  104  95.6  98.9  97.7  95.5  97.6  95.0  100  103
(5)  26.5  16.0  24.7  na  22.1  17.0  21.6  22.3  27.3  16.3  20.4  22.4
Definitions:  (1)  Per  capita  GDP (Current  Dollars);  (2)  Life  Expectancy  at
Birth;  (3)  Schooling  Enrollment  Ratio  (Primary);  (4)  Production  Per-capita  of
Food (1979-81-100);  (5)  Manufacturing  GDP  as a  proportion  of total  GDP.
Arg:  Argentina;  Colt  Colombia;  Chi:  Chile,  Uru:  Uruguay.
Sources:  World  Tables  1987,  The  World  Bank,  1988,  and  Bank  Socio  Economic  Data
(BESD).
The  four  countries  used  import  substitution  strategies  (ISSs)  since  the
19406,  although  Colombia  abandoned  it in  the  late  1960.  (IBRD,  1984).
Considerable  government  intervention  in  goods  and  factors  markets  was  mostly  a
corollary  of the  failure  of the  ISS. As time  passed,  the  industrialization
expected  to result  from  the  ISS  created  instead  progressive  macro  imbalances
without  providing  more  wages  and  employment  [Corbo,  19861,  resulting  in  a
surge  in  interventionism.  The  more obvious  cases  of this  surge  were  Chile  in
1970-73  and  Argentina  in  1973-75.
Data  in Table  2 indicate  another  similarity  among  the  four  countries:
chronic  economic  instability.  Over  the  period  1960-85,  fluctuating  GDP  growth
rates,  a  varying  but  normally  low  proportion  of output  invested  domestically,
widely  fluctuating  real  exchange  rates  and  persistent  inflation  characterized
these  countries. Yet, some  differences  in the  degree  of instability  appear
upon  closer  inspection,  particularly  in the  case  of  Colombia,  which  does  not18
have  an inflationary  history  and  has  not experienced  comparable  declines  in
aggregate  economic  activity  nor similar  fiscal  imbalances.  On a positive
note,  these  differences  among  our  countries  provide  us  with  more variance  for
the  statistical  analysis.
During  the  1970s,  the  four  countries  made  efforts  towards  building  up
more outward  oriented  economies. They  also  attempted  to reduce  the  economic
size  of the  state,  thus  eliminating  a source  of inflation  and  intervention
throughout  the  economy. This  reform  effort  was  notable  in  the  southern  cone
countries,  particularly  Chile. To a different  extent  but following  a  quite
similar  philosophy,  these  countries  pursued  trade  liberalization,  market
deregulation,  a large  financial  opening,  along  with stabilization,  demand
management  policies  and  use  of exchange  rate  policies  to  cut inflation  down
(Edwards  & Edwards  (1988),  Corbo  & De Melo (1987)3.  Overvaluation,  persistent
fiscal  disequilibrium  and  a rapid  relaxation  of restrictions  on the  capital
account  produced  unsustainable  trade  deficits  and  external  indebtness
(Barandiaran,  1988). In  Colombia  during  the  second  half of the  19708,  the
coffee  boom  and  exogenous  capital  inflows  boosted  reserves  and  the  debt-
servicing  capacity  of the  country,  also  supporting  indebtness  when the  price
hike  was over. As a result  of these  policies,  Colombia  also  needed  macro
adjustment  in the  early  19808.
The  reduction  in  domestic  expenditures  in  1983-84  was substantial  in  all
the  countries,  but  Colombia,  while  real  devaluations  fulfilled  a  key role  in
the  process  of adjustment.  Since  then  the  adjustment  has  been  slow,  with
varying  degrees  of success. Chile  and  Colombia  are  the  countries  where  a  more
sustained  recovery  has taken  place (Barandiaran,  1988).19
Table  2
Economic  Indicators  for  the  Chosen  Countries
1. GDP  Growth  Rate  2. CPI  Ilflation  3.Fiscal  Deficit/GDP
Arg  Col  Chi  Uru  Arg  Cal  Chi  Uru  Arg  Cal  Chi  Uru
1961  10.1  5.1  4.8  3.0  14.0  8.7  7.0  22.5  1.4  2.0  4.5  na
1965  11.6  3.5  0.8  1.2  28.5  19.8  31.3  56.5  2.2  0.6  4.1  3.6
1970  6.4  9.3  2.1  6.5  13.6  6.8  32.6  17.0  0.8  0.9  2.7  1.4
1975  0.2  2.3  -12.9  5.9  182.3  22.9  379.2  81.4  12.3  0.2  2.6  4.4
1980  2.4  4.1  7.8  6.0  100.8  26.5  35.1  63.5  4.8  1.8  -3.1  0.0
1981  -6.8  2.3  5.5  1.9  104.5  27.5  19.7  34.0  5.4  3.0  -1.7  1.5
1982  -4.6  0.9  -14.1  -9.4  164.8  24.5  9.9  19.0  8.7  1.6  2.3  9.1
1983 2.8  1.6  -0.7  -5.9  343.8 19.8  27.3 49.2  13.9  1.1  3.8  3.9
1984 2.6  3.4  6.3  -1.5  626.7 16.1  19.9 55.3  11.0  4.0  5.2
1985  -4.5  3.6  2.4  0.0  672.1 24.0  30.7 72.2  2.4  6.3  2.2
4.  Investment/GDP  5.  Trade  Deficit/GDP  6.  Real  tzchange  Rate
Arg  Col  Chi  Uru  Arg  Col  Chi  Uru  Arg  Col  Chi  Uru
1961  25.0  19.2 14.6  17.9 -3.3  -1.5  -1.9  -0.5  118  100  104  103
1965  16.7  16.3 14.7  10.7  2.2  2.8  2.7  4.2  100  100  100  100
1970  21.6 20.2  16.5  11.5  1.2  -0.2  3.3  0.9  102  135  149  97
1975  25.9  17.0 13.1  13.5 -1.4  2.1  1.0  -3.0  109  137  202  88
1980  22.2  19.1 21.0  17.3  -0.9 -0.9 -2.8  -6.0  39  108  125  58
1981  18.8  20.6 22.7  15.4  0.6  -4.3  -8.2 -3.2  50  108  115  57
1982  15.9  20.5 11.3  14.4  4.9  -5.8  0.3  2.4  118  108  145  65
1983  10.6  19.9  9.8  10.0  5.7  -3.9  5.0  7.8  111  114  182  112
1984  11.3  18.7 13.6  9.9  5.1  0.7  1.5  3.7  102  131  198  122
1985  8.5  18.5 13.7  8.2  7.4  -0.1  5.3  4.2  122  155  256  132
Definitions  and  Sources:
(1)  Yearly  Growth  Rate (IMF:  IFS];  (2)  Yearly  Average  Inflation  [IMF:  IFS];
(3)  Overall  Fiscal  Deficit  (IMF:IFS;  for  Chile:  Central  Bank,  Indicadores
Economicos  y  Sociales;  for  Argentina,  De  Pablo  (1987)1;  (4)  Gross  Domestic
Investment  [World  Bank :BESD];  (5)  Exports  (fob)  minus  Imports  (Cif)  [IMF:
IFS];  (6)  Ratio  of  CPI-US  the  country's  CPI  multiplied  the  nominal  exchange
rate (Cottani(1987)].
From  the  view  point  of the  labor  market,  the  four  countries  also  share
some  common  characteristics.  First,  government  intervention  in  wage setting
is important. In Chile  and  Argentina  the  instrument  most  often  used  is
indexation  through  government  control,  although  in  the  former  country  there20
have  been  some  discontinuities  in  this  policy.  in  Uruguay,  the  government
intervenes  Ln  wage  bargaining  carried  out  at  the  national  levels,  thus
influencing  the  prevailing  wage  structure  in  the  formal  sector.  In  Colombia
intervention  takes  place  mostly  through  non-wage  cost  regulations  CuRD.
1985),  although  the  policy  of  sustaining  an  increase  in  real  wages  has  also
been  successful.  In  all  four  countries  wage  intervention  is  also  accomplished
through  minimum  wage  policies,  which  positively  affects  average  wages  and
inflation  (Paldam  & Rivera.,  1969).  Althought  HWe  have  declined  ln  real  terms
in  the  southern  cone  (Table  3),  this  has  rot  occurred  with  the  ratio  of  HWs  to
unskilled  wages,  a  more  relevant  indicator  of  their  effect  on  the  labor
market.
Public  sector  employment  has  been  used  in  these  countries  to  deal  with
the  inability  of  the  economy  to  keep  up  with  the  growth  of  the  labor  force.
The  proportion  of  public  sector  employment  to  total  employment  is  very  similar
in  the  three  southern  cone  countries  (Table  3). This  ratio  has  been
increasing  in  Colombia  steadily  way  over  time,  while  recently  decreasing  in
the  other  countries.  The  use  of  public  sector  employment  to  provide  a  buffer
for  the  slow  growth  of  private  sector  employment  is  clearly  suggested  by  the
growth  in  public  employment.  This  has  been  less  marked  in  Colombia,  but  it  is
significant  in  Uruguay  and  Argentina  (Riveros  (1987,  1989),  Riveros  &  Sanchez
(1989)].21
Table  S
Labor  Market  IndicAt*or  In  the  Chosen  Countries
Lc  U  Mv/Wu
Arg  Cal  Chi  Uru  Arg  Col  Chi  Uru  Ari  Cal  Chi  Uru
1960  11.3  1.6  7.7  na  8.a  7.4  7.4  na  100  100  100  na
1965  9.7  2.0  8.3  7,6  5.4  10.3  6.5  7.1  56  116  79  100
i970  9.1  2.7  10.1  8.3  5.2  9.9  5.7  0.6  44  107  65  89
1975  9.7  3.3  12.l 10.2  3.5  11.2 11.4  6.0  39  133  146  136
1980  8.6  4.1  8.3  9.4  2.8  10.0 13.3  6.0  30  123  99  121
1981  8.6  4.1  8.6  9.6  5.1  6.7  14.5  3.2  32  105  79  139
1982  8.3  4.1  7.7  10.2  5.5  9.3  14.8  9.3  43  110  78  136
1983  8.3  4.4  8.7  10.4  4.8  11.0 15.4  12.2  43  125  96  140
1i84  8.6  4.9  6.5  10.8  4.8  13.2 15.8  11.2  44  134  85  154
1985  9.0  5.3  8.2  10.1  6.4  14.0  16.2 10.6  e,<147  83  154
Wi/P  Wu/P  WI/Wu
Arg  Col  Chi  Uru  Arg  Cal  Chi  Uru  Arg  Cal  Chi  Uru
1960  100  100  100  na  100  100  100  na  100  100  100  na
1965  135  123  105  100  135  129  120  100  100  96  88  100
1970  137  143  161  92  138  107  178  85  99  135  94  108
1975 160  136  70  83  158  89  99  74  102  152  71  112
1980 138  160  122  81  113  124  149  72  122  129  82  113
1981  125  171  148  89  102  150  185  62  122  114  80  131
1982 112  184  158  92  82  148  183  66  137  124  86  140
1983  125  193  116  78  121  137  121  56  103  141  96  139
1984  137  202  109  73  132  133  116  50  104  152  94  146
1985  112  184  91  81  108  126  113  58  104  146  81  140
Definitionss  Lg-  Proportion  of  ;?ublic  Sector  Employment  (Central  Government,
Public  Firms  and  regional  Goveraments)  over  total  employment;  U-  Open
Unemployment  rates  (Number  of  umemployed  divided  by  Labor  Force);  Mw/Wu-
Minimum  Wages  divided  by  unskil.;d  wages  (Own  account  workers  with  less  than  8
years  of  schooling);  Wu/P  Real  U:bkilled  Labor  Wages  Deflator:  CPI)s  Ws/P
(Real  Skilled  Labor  Wages  over  CII);  Ws/Wu-  Ratio  skilled  to  unskilled  wages.
Sources:  Sanchez  (1988);  Ibarra  (1988);  Paredes  (1988);  Reyes  (1987).
A review  of  the  labor  market  data  included  in  Table  3 suggests  that:  1)
the  ratio  Mw/Wu  has  increased  in  all  the  countries  since  1981,  thus  indicating
a  likely  important  role  for  wage  indexation;  2)  the  effect  of  the  adjustment
in  the  19809  has  created  more  unemployment  in  all  the  four  countries,  probably
as  a  likely  result  of  an  uneven  allocative  job  of  the  labor  market;  3)  the
observed  increase  in  the  wage  differential  between  skilled  and  unskilled  labor22
in 1980s  (with  the  exception  of  Argentina)  suggests  that  there  was  a positive
connection  with devaluation  policies  (Table  1)20.
4.  Statistical  Results.
Tables  Sa to Sd  present  the  3SLS  estimates  of the  structural  equations
of the  model for  the  four  countries. In  most  cases,  the  results  obtained  with
2SLS  were  not statistically  different  from  those  reported,  thus  indicating
that  the  correlation  of  errors  is  not  an important  source  of inefficiency.
The  quality  of the  fit  is  acceptable  and,  in  general,  we obtain  right  signs  of
the  coefficients.
The  inclusion  of  public  sector  employment  in the  first  equation  did  not
yield  significant  results  in  any  of the  countries 2l.  We also  used  this
variable  in the  Wu equation  --  thus  assuming  government  uses  mostly  unskilled
labor  --  but  without  satisfactory  results. In general,  we can  safely  conclude
that  public  sector  employment  does  not  affect  market  wages,  a probable  reason
being  that  labor  is  hired  at  wages  below  market  rates,  possibly  in exchange
for  job  security. 22 Similarly,  the  variable  ex-past  indexation  did  not  exert
any  significant  effect  in  explaining  the  variation  in  Ws.  The  variable  Pt  was
measured  as the  WPI  of industrial  countries  multiplied  by the  nominal  exchange
rate. The  variable  Pn  was  measured  through  the  nontradable  deflators  taken
20. Note also that in'  Argentina  there  has been no increase  in the real
exchange  rate in most of the  period,  thus  contrasting  with the experience  of
the  other  three  countries.
21.  The  variable  *fiscal  expenditure"  was  included  instead,  but  it  did  not
produce  significant  parameters.
22.  This  is  a  hypothesis  suggested  for  the  case  of  LDCs  in  various  studies
(for  a summLry,  see  Fallon  & Riveros,1989).  In  many  Latin  American  countries  it
has  been found  that  for  similar  skills,  public  sector  wages  are  lower  than  the
private  ones [Paredes  (1983);  Riveros  (1988),  Fox(1989),  Klinov  (1987)].23
from  national  accounts. The  Appendiz  contains  further  explanation  on the
empirical  data.
In  both  wage  equations  we Included  lagged  wages  to  test  for  the  effect
of inertial  forces,  allowing  us to  distinguish  between  short  and  long  run
elasticities.  In the  caue  of the  first  equation  we alternatively  tested  for
the  effect  of prevailing  labor  market  disequilibrium  in  the  form  of open
unemployment.  In all  the  cases  this  latter  variable  was superior,  although  in
Uruguay  it  did  not  come  out statistically  significant.
The  presentation  of the  3SLS  results  in  Tables  5a to  Sd is  based  on a
test  on the  restrictions  imposed  regarding  homogeneity.  Thus,  if the
restriction  concerning  the  parameters  was  not satisfied  statistically,  the
unrestricted  estimate  (U)  is  included  in  Table  5.  The  latter  comprises  the
case  of  both  wage equations  for  Chile,  the  formal  sector  wages  equation  for
Argentina  and  Uruguay  and  the  income  equation  for  Colombia  and  Uruguay.
With  the  exception  of  Colombia,  the  estimates  show  the  significance  of
Bt in the  Ws equation,  a  variable  which  proxies  changes  in the  distortionary
factor  associated  with  government  and  union  intervention.  In  absence  of  a
significant  effect  of ex-post  indexation  on nominal  wage growth,  the
significance  of  Bt indicates  the  likely  important  role  played  by aggregate
wage adjustment  policies  implemented  by  the  government,  as opposed  to  what
would  result  from  private  wage  bargaining.
As shown  by the  t- tests,  the  effect  of changes  in  price  of tradables  on
nominal  formal  sector  wages  is  positive  in  almost  all  cases. Only in
Colombia,  the  test  is  not  significant,  thus  suggesting  that  tradable  inflation
would  not  be  relevant  to  determine  the  level  of  nominal  formal  wages.  With
regard  to the  impact  of  price  of  non-tradables  on formal  sector  wages,  the24
parameter  is  not  significant  only  in  Argentina,  although  the  elasticity  is
relatively  small  in  Chile  and  Uruguay. The  result  for  Argentina  can  be
interpreted  on the  basis  of traditional  wage  policies  which  indexed  formal
sector  wages  to terms  of trade  fluctuations  (Riveros,  1989). 4nterestingly,
although  the  direct  effect  of  the  price  of tradables  on  wages  is relatively
small  in  Uruguay  and  Colombia,  the  indirect  effect  (through  the  price  of  non-
tradables)  seems  to  compensate.
We found  a  positive  relationship  between  minimum  wages  and  Ws in  all  the
countries,  thus  indicating  the  existence  of substitution  between  skilled  and
unskilled  labor  in the  formal  sector. This  implies  that  a decline  in real  MWs
under  relatively  rigid  formal  sector  wages  will allow  expansion  in employment
of unskilled  labor  and  compensate  for  the  drop  in the  informal  sector  labor
demand  resulting  from  a nominal  devaluation.  In general,  investment 23 does
not  have  a significant  effect  on formal  sector  wages,  but in  the  case  of
Uruguay,  this  variable  is  highly  significant.  In all  the  cases,  except
Uruguay,  lagged  open  unemployment  significantly  affects  observed  wage changes.
With regard  to the  informal  sector  wages  equation,  the  results  indicate
that  the  effect  of price  of tradables  is  zero (Uruguay  and  Chile),  positive
(Colombia)  or negative  (Argentina).  Since  a  parameter  equal  to zero  implies
that  an increase  in prices  does  not  affect  nominal  wages  --  thus  yielding  a
decline  in real  wages  in terms  of tradables  --  we take  the  latter  evidence  to
indicate  that  real  informal  sector  wages  decline  in terms  of tradables  in
23  This  variable  was  expressed  as  a  proportion  of lagged  income,  to  proxy
the theoretical  variable  'percentage  change  in capital  stock'.  This can be
interpreted  as the  ICOR  ratio,  which  would  be proxying  the  theoretical  variable
sectoral  capital  stock'.  The  quality  of  the  results  partly  reflects  the  nature
of the  proxy  used.25
presence  of a  nominal  devaluation 24. Thus,  the  significance  test  would  allow
us to  conclude  that  in  all  cases,  but  Colombia,  an increase  in  Pt implies  a
decline  in real  informal  sector  wages.
Only  in  Argentina  does ;he  variable  investment  seem  to affect  informal
sector  wages  significantly.  The  poor  results  of the  empirical  model  with
regard  to investment  are  probably  associated  with the  absence  of adequate
indicators  on sectoral  capital  stocks. Labor  force  growth  negatively  affects
equilibrium  wages  in the  informal  sector,  a result  consistent  with  our
previous  expectations.  However,  only  in the  cases  of  Uruguay  and  Chile  the
effect  of the  MW on  Wu is  negative  and  significant.  In  the  case  of  Argentina
that  effect  is  positive,  which  is  a result  not  easy  to interpret  in the
context  of the  model 25. Finally,  We positively  affect  Wu in  Chile  and
Uruguay,  thus  indicating  that  for  a given  MW,  an increase  in  Ws will cause  a
substitution  away  from  skilled  labor,  an increase  in  the  demand  for  unskilled
labor  in the  formal  sector,  a decline  in  the  effective  labor  supply  to the
informal  sector,  and  a decline  in  Wu.
The  direct  effect  of  PT on  wages  shown  in the  corresponding  parameter
does  not account  for  the  total  impact  of that  variable. To  obtain  an estimate
of the  total  impact  of changes  in  PT on formal  and  informal  wages,  we totally
differentiate  the  three  first  equations  of the  system,  obtaining
24. In alternative  specifications,  in absence  of the lagged  unemployment
in this  equation,  the  joint  test  turned  out  to  be insignificant.
25  Severance  compensations  are expressed  in terms of monthly  MWs in
Argentina.  Thus, an increase  in the MW reduces  normal turnover  rates,  not
necessarily  implying  an increase  in labor  spillovers  to the  informal  sector.26
dWs - a2dPT +  a3 dPN
dWU - BldPT +  82 dWU +  B3 dPN
dPN  - 7 1dPT  +  72 dWU +  73dWs
solving,  we arrive  at
dW  a  3 E71 +  7281  +  73 a2 ]
dPT  2  1  72(B3  B3 a2  B3  - 3)  T3a3
dWu  +  E33+ 82P2 +  :!  ]  71 +  72 1 +  3a2
dP  1  1-72 (B3  +  B2 a2 + 33  V  - 73 a3
Given  that  the  variables  are  in rate  of changes,  those  expressions
correspond  to the  formal  wages  - price  of tradables  elasticity  and  the
informal  wages  - price  of tradable  elasticity  [E(W.,  PT)  and  E (WU,  PT)
respectively.  Both  elasticities  were estimated  on the  basis  of the
corresponding  parameters,  and  the  following  values  were obtained.
E(WsPT)  E(WUPT)
Argentine  1.41  -0.23
Chile  1.07  0.47
Colombia  1.54  0.61
Uruguay  1.30  1.07
In  general,  nominal  formal  sector  wages  are  more  responsive  to
exchange  rate  changes. We cannot  assess  the  statistical  significance  of those
values,  given  that  the  distribution  of both  eatimated  elasticities  is
undetermined.  The  relativity  high  value  of  E(WUPT)  in  the  cases  of Argentina27
and  Colombia  --  which  is  probably  significantly  greater  than  one  --  and  of
E(WU,PT)  in the  case  of  Uruguay,  which  is  probably  equal  to  one  --  calls  our
attention  to  problems  with  the  basic  information.  On the  other  hand,  those
values  are  not  unbelievable  and  have  to  be interpreted  in  a very  general  from.
The  basic  conclusion  obtained  from  this  analysis  is  that  a  devaluation  causes
an increase  in the  formal/informal  wage  gap  in all  the  countries;  the  relative
real  rigidity  of formal  sector  wages,  as  measured  by the  ratio  E(W.,
PT)/E(WUPT)  is in  average  of about  3.
In general,  the  positive  and  significant  effect  of  price  of
tradables  on formal  sector  wages,  vis-a-vis  the  relatively  smaller  one  on
informal  wages,gives  support  to  our  contention  that  a segmented  market
produces  inequitable  devaluations.  The  only  exception  to  this  would  be the
case  of  Uruguay,  where  there  is  a relatively  similar  positive  effect  in  both
cases. This  evidence  suggests  that  formal  sector  wages  are  more indexed  to
consumer  prices  than  informal  sector  wages. Data  in Table  6 indicates  that  in
fact  this  is the  case,  given  that  the  response  of skilled  wages  to changes  in
the  CPI  is positive  and significant,  while  in  the  case  of  Wu it is  not 26.
The  estimates  presented  in  Table  5c indicate  that  in  the  four
countries  changes  in the  aggregate  income  yield  a significant  positive  effect
on the  price  of  non-tradables.  In  all  cases  the  nominal  exchange  rate  appears
to affect  Pn,  thus  also  indirectly  affecting  wages  of skilled  and  unskilled
workers. This  positive  effect  indicates  a degree  of ineffectiveness  of
nominal  devaluations,  as shown  by the  strong  combined  effect  of the  variable
26.  In addition,  given  that  the  nominal  amount  corresponding  to  non-wage
labor  costs  is  also  positively  correlated  with  inflation  in  the  four  countries,
the  total  effect  of  inflation  on  wages  of  skilled  labor  is  a  function  of  the  two
respective  parameters.28
price  of tradablem  and  the  nominal  exchange  rate 2 7 . In attempting  to further
investigate  the  causal  connection  of this  positive  effect  of the  price  of
tradables  on the  price  of  non-tradables,  we estimated  a  more  general  version
of the  Pn  equation,  in  which  we included  a cross-effect  between  PT and
alternative  measures  of the  labor  market  distortion 28. As  seen  in  Table  7, in
all  countries  at least  one  of these  cross-effects  is statistically
significant,  thus  allowing  us to  conclude  that  the  presence  of labor  market
distortions  are  important  in  explaining  relatively  ineffective  devaluations 29
With only  the  exception  of  Argentina  --  where  the  HW exerts  a
negative  effect  --  the  wage  variables  have  a positive  effect  on Pn.  In the
case  of Uruguay.  however,  none  of the  wage  variables  significantly  affect  the
dependent  variable. With regard  to investment,  in  Colombia  and  Uruguay  the
effect  on Pn is significant  and  with the  expected  negative  sign.
The  effect  of the  price  of tradables  in the  income  equation  is
significant  in  the  four  countries,  as  well  as the  effect  of the  price  of  non-
tradables. The  positive  sign  associated  to PT indicates  the  partial.effect  of
a  nominal  devaluation  on income. However,  as long  as a real  devaluation  is
not  achieved  due  to the  effect  of  wage rigidities  on the  price  of  non-
27.  In  another  paper,  we investigate  the  extent  of  ineffective  devaluations
based  on  the  structure  of  the  skilled  wages  equation  (Lopez  &  Riveros,  1989b).
28. The  variable  MW/Wu  measures  the  wage differential  between  wages of
unskilled labor in the formal and the informal  sector. B/Ws measure the
importance  of non-wage costs of labor relative  to prevailing  wages. The
specification  adopted  implies  that  the  observed  effect  of  PT  on Pn includes  the
impact  of labor  market  distortions.
29.  The  results  indicated  here,  as they  based  in  an ad-hoc  equation,  must
be handled  carefully.  They  are  only  indicative  of the  impact  of the  prevailing
labor  market  structure  on ineffective  devaluations.  A structural  test  is found
in  Lopez  & Riveros  (1989b).29
tradables,  the  effectiveness  of  nominal  devaluation  is  likely  to  be  low. The
wage  variables  are  normally  accompanied  by  the  expected  negative  coefficient,
with  the  only  exception  of  Wu  in  Argentina  and  Ws  in  Uruguay.  The  variable
investment  was  not  significant  in  estimating  the  income  equatiqn,  the
exception  being  in  the  case  of  Colombia  (with  90X  confidence  interval).
5.  Conclusions.
An  adequate  understanding  of  the  process  of  adjustment  in  the
presence  of  SLMs  is  crucial  for  better  policy  design.  Previous  theoretical
analyses  have  shown  that  segmentation  accompanied  by  indexation  would  yield  an
increase  in  the  formal/informal  wage  gap  in  the  presence  of  adjustment
policies.  This  would  hamper  the  process  of  labor  reallocation  sought  by
changes  in  relative  prices  of  tradables  to  non-tradables,  thus  making  it  more
difficult  to  achieve  a real  devaluation.  Ihe  positive  effect  of  a  devaluation
on  the  formallinformal  wage  gap  implies  a  distributive  result  that  may  also
affect  the  credibility  and  sustainability  of  adjustment  programs.
In  this  paper  we  used  a  model  to  analyze  the  joint  determination  of
wages,  prices  and  income  in  a  typical  LDC  with  SLMs. The  empirical  result
support  the  hypothesis  that  an  increase  in  the  relative  price  of  tradables/
non-tradables  will  raise  the  formal/informal  wage  gap. Given  that  the
informal  sector  is  mostly  a  producer  of  non-tradables,  while  the  formal  sector
must  allow  resources  to  move  to  tradable  production,  the  predicted  change  in
wage  differentials  implies  difficulties  in  achieving  a  real  devaluation.  In
fact,  real  formal  sector  wages  appear  to  be  relatively  more  rigid.  Moreover,
our  evidence  suggests  that  labor  market  distortions  play  an  important  role  in30
connection  witn the  impact  of the  price  of  tradables  on  price  of non-
tradables.
There  are  some  caveats  in  this  statistical  analysis,  mostly  derived
from  the  approzimative  nature  of some  of our  indicators.  Problems  are  also
associated  with the  use  of yearly  data  to analyze  an issue  that  for  many if
the  countries  should  be tested  with  more continuous  observations.  Finally,
there  are  problems  with the  model,  in  the  sense  that  a  more complete
specification  must include  labor  supply  and  demand  functions  and  a  more
thorough  mechanism  of determination  on the  supply  side  and  the  trade  balance.
The  limitations  imposed  by the  available  data  and  the  need  for  a manageable
model  is  compensated  by the  possibility  of cross  country  comparisons,  thus
making  our  results  more solid  and  discussion  of the  limitations  more
substantial.
A basic  policy  implication  stemming  from  this  study  is that  the
structure  of the  labor  market  must  be taken  into  account  in the  design  of
adjustment  programs. Even  if real  wages  are  partially  indexed,  in the
presence  of segmentation  a  heavier  burden  of the  adjustment  would  be  put  on
the  poorest  segment  of the  labor  force,  making  the  program  distributionally
unfair. The  effect  on the  political  sustainability  is  probably  as important
as  the  one  concerning  the  effectiveness  of  nominal  devaluations.  Deregulation
of the labor  market  should  be an  essential  component  of  macroeconomic
adjustment  programs,  particularly  with regad  to indexation  schemes  and
government  intervention  on  wages,  which  reach  only  the  formal  sector  of the
economy. Another  important  implication  is the  need for  mechanisms  to
accelerate  inter-industry  labor  mobility  in  the  adjustment,  which  may
'necessitate  training  and  special  programs  to improve  specific  skills  and31
information  on job  opportunities.  This  would  also  reduce  the  social  cost  of
adjustment  implicit  in increasing  wage  differentials,  poor labor  mobility  and
rising  unemployment.32
%PPENDIXt  Empirical data
The  macroeconomic  data for  the  empirical  analysis  were  obtained  from
standard  statLstical  sources  avallable  in  ANDREX  or  BESD. A list  with  the
definitions  is  presented  below. The  only  change  effected  in  basic  official
figures  was in the  case  of  Chile  where  we used  a 'corrected  CPI (Cortazar  &
Marshall,  1979). The  period  of estimation  ls  1960-1985  but  in the  case  of
Uruguay  only  the  period  1965-85  is considered  due  lack  of adeuqate  information
on some  of the  labor  market  variables.  With regard  to  wage data  we resorted
to sources  containing  information  on skilled/unskilled  workers;  this
information  was  obtained  from  labor  force  surveys,  and  the  definition  of
unskilled  (informal  sector)  workers  was that  of own  account  workers  with  less
than  8  years  of schooling;  in  Uruguay  data  used  corresponded  to employed
unskilled  labor  in  general. The  variable  B  was  measured  through  the
proportion  of non-wage  costs  associated  to  employment  in formal  sector  firms.
Unemployment  is  measured  through  available  open  unemployment  rates,  whose
definition  is similar  in the  four  countries  (namely,  persons  engaged  in  active
job  searching).  Employment  in  the  public  sector  correspond  to  both  central
government  and  public  enterprises.
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G  - Current  Government  Expenditures.
I  - Gross  Domestic  Investment.
Money  Supply  (Demand  Deposits  and  Currency  in  Circulation).
P  - GDP  Implicit  Price  Deflator. 
PN  - Ron-Traded  Goods  Prices  (Weighted  Average  of Services  and  Construction
GDP  Price  Deflators).
*  - Bilateral  Real  Exchange  Rates  vis-a-vis  the  US dollar  using  CPI  as
deflators.
el  - Multilateral  Real  Exchange  Rate  via-a-via  top  10 trading  partners  using
CPIs  as deflators  and  Total  Trade  as  weights.
T  - Direct  and  Indirect  Taxes  net  of Subsidies.
PT*  - Industrial  Countries  weighted  Wholesale  Price  Index.
Xd  - Disposable  Incomes  GDP  less  net  taxes  (T).
GDP  - Gross  Domestic  Product  at  Market  Prices.
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Structural  Estimate:  Wawe  of  Skilled  Labor
(8sLs)
Constant  Bt  PT  pH  w  I  P-Pe  U(-1)  R 2 Dv  F
Arugutine  -106.6  -0.741  1.70  0.094  0.44S  5.660  -5.667  -. 078  0.06  1.86
(U)  (-1.10)  (-0.84)  (1.61)  (2.59)  (6.21)  (2.01)  (-1.42)  (-0.25)
-29.10  0.401  1.22  0.479  0.517  1.94
(-1.14)  (1.87)  (2.60)  (6.26)  (11.68)  (1.65)
Chile  (U)  -40.89  1.086  1.89  0.240  -0.470  -0.196  -1.28  -4.7M2  0.97  1.96
(1.88)  (4.80)  (8.56) (-1.29)  (7.86)  (0.13)  (-1.07)  (1.75)
-81.68  1.218  1.09  -0.216  0.455  0.196  -8.478  0.97  '.10
(40.94)  (6.82)  (4.58)  (-1.26)  (7.06)  (0.1S)  (-1.84)
Colombl  20.69  0.048  0.26  0.919  0.156  -1.10  -0.420  -0.109  0.79  1.80  2.1
(1.16)  (0.68)  (0.11)  (6.12)  (2.28)  (-I..07)  (-1.90)  (-1.71)
12.60  0.0OJ  0.747  O.m  0.128  -0.57  -0.18  0.79  1.60  2.
(0.7e)  (1.04)  (1.99)  (4.02)  (1.09)  (-4.60)  (-2.18)
Urugay  (U)  -7.041a  0.242  0.96  0.6  0.006  1.84S  0.664  0.077  0.06  1.76  -
- (-0.56)  (1.06)  (1.09)  (1.65)  (4.20)  (2.82)  (1.8)  (0.64)
-16.20  0.06S  0.919  0.414  0.666  1.492  0.1S4  0.07  1.72  -
(-1.80)  (0.25)  (1.01)  (2.11)  (4.89)  (2.51)  (1.48)
Set  laitlos:
ad  a  shift  coeficient  MW  Miniml  Wag  DVW  a  Durbin-Upteon  Statistics
S1  *  Rel non-we"  coste  of  labor  I  *  Agrege  Investment  P7 TI  a  Joint  Significance  Test
P  a  (World)  Price  of  Tradable  p  *  Current  Inf  lation  FSC  a  F Statistics  (2SLS  vs SSLS)
*  *  minal  Exchango  Rate  p  Expected  Inflation
PN  a  Price  of Non-tradable.  U(-1)  *  Lagged  Unemployment  Rate
Note:  Variable  are  express in  rates  of  change
(U)  a  Unrestricted  Regression.Table  Sb
Structural  Estimtes:  Wa9n  of  Unskillod  Workers
_(SLS)
Bo  _  PT  pH  We  I  N  MW  Wu(-,)  R2 Dwth))  F 88
Argsstla  #8.34  -0.96  0.681  -0.207  1.852  -1.664  0.911  -0.679.  0.99  2.52  8.6
(2.11) (-2.66)  (3.59) (-2.23)  (1.81) (-1.83)  (12.14)  (-3.72)
Chile  (U)  -15.94  -0.268  1.512  0.126  1.174  -. 311  4O.91  0.876  0.99  1.92  -
(-0.79) (-0.22)  (8.48)  (1.48)  (1.16) (-1.65)  (2.77)  (0.96)
Celembol  -8.62  0.96  0.026  -0.002  0.375  -0.228 -0.060  0.752  0.51  n.e.  0.25
(-0.11)  (2.16)  0.40)  (-1.67)  (0.20) (-2.04) (0.42)  (1.09)
Ursguay  40.62  0.149  0.99  0.609  -1.28  -8.86  -0.949  0.140  0.59  n.s.  2.60
(1.87)  (0.86)  (1.62)  (1.50) (-0.82) (-1.43)  (-2.10)  (1.10)
I  _
eotiuitie.e:
B  a  shift  oeff  iclest;  Me  a  W_u  of  Skilled  Labor  Df  (h)  a  Durbin-Wateon  (Durbin  h)  Statistics
PT  a  (World) Price  of  Tradablee  I  a  Aggregat  Invetmeat  PT* *  Joint  Significanc  Test
a  * NMinoal  Exchngs  Rate  N  a  Labor  Force  F 86  s  F  Statistics  (2SLS  vs  BSLS)
fb  Price  of  Nee-tradablee  W  a  Minlimu  Wqgee
Nets :  /  *a  L  opn  nleynt  rate
(U)  a  Unusricted  Regresion.
t-tet betwen becket
Variables,  defioed  In  ate of  changes.Table  Sc
Structural  Estimates: Price  of  Non-Tradab!os
(OSLS)
CO  PT  Wj  W*  MW  I  Yd  1R
2 DW  FSS
Argentina  -10.75  0.548  0.02C  0.167  -0.241  0.112  0.796  0.99  1.96  0.18
(0.49)  (10.96)  (0.17)  (8.45)  (-2.24)  (0.11)  (7.06)
Chile  -4.27  0.422  0.881  -0.028  -0.219  0.04  0.287  0."  2.14
(-0.75)  (5.22)  (6.04)  (-1.01)  (6.78)  (0.10)  (11.99)
Colombia  18.6  0.619  0.27S  0.062  0.046  -1.816  0.270  0.88  1.65  6.6
(1.90)  (7.55)  (4.06)  (2.28)  (1.51) (-2.48)  (8.66)
Uruuay  6.584  0.785  -0.044  0.066  0.068  -0.401  0.662  0.96  1.87  2.0
co  (1.14)  (9.47)  (-1.80)  (1.00)  (0.62)  (-1.86)  (2.28)
D0.fimtiom:
C*  a  shift  eoet Icielt  W 5 u  Wages  of  Skilled  Labor plus  DW  a  Durbin-Watson  Statistics
Pt"  a  (World)  Price  of  Tradable.  mo-wege  costa  of  labor  PT#e  a  Joint  Significance  Test
*  a  smimal  Exchange  Rate  a  *  MIini  Wag  FS  a  F Statistics  (2SL3 we 8SLS)
a  Wags  of  Umakillo  Labor  I  a  Aggreate  Investment
Yd  a  Disposable Incom
Note: t-stotistice  between  brackets
All  variables  expressed  In  ratee  of  chang..Table  Sd
Structural  Estimates:  Agareate  Income
(3SLS)
do  . PT  PH  WS  Wu  M-  I  R 2 DW  F86
Argentina  3.61  0.360  0.600  -0.004  0.199  -0.056  0.031  0.99  2.18  -3.7
(0.21)  (3.08)  (4.12)  (-0."-e)  (1.7S)  (-0.62)  (0.04)
Chil  7.25  0.282  3.397  0.116  -1.103  -0.i22  0.171  0.96  2.16  2.3
(0.29)  (2.50)  (12.77)  (1.15) (-3.94)  (-5.66)  (0.12)
Colombia (U)  6.97  0.02  1.22  -0.109  -0.171  -0.006  0.609  0.84  2.09  --
(0.59)  (0.61)  (6.12)  (-3.04)  (-1.70)  (0.18)  (1.32)
Uruay  (U)  -11.40  0.113  1.244  0.003  -0.062  -0.094  0.196  0.96  1.46  --
(-1.99)  (1.71)  (7.69)  (0.06)  (-1.62)  (-1.41)  (0.66)
Definitions:
do  a  shift  oefficit  U  a  Wage of  Unskilled  Labor  FS 3 *  F Test  (2SLS  versus  JSLS)
PT  a  Price  of  Tradables  W  H  MIllnis.  Wage
P  a  Price  of Nontradables  I  a  Aggregat  Invostment
W  a  Wags of  Sklled  Labor  OW *  Durkin Watson  Statistic
Notes:  U a Unrestricted  equatton
t-t4lts  be  bracket
All  variable  defined  In  rate  of  changeTable  So
Wage Equations
(2SLS)
A.  Skilled  Labor
Constant  pl  mW  I  U(-lj  R 2 ow
ArgontIna  -9.687  0.751  0.438  0.488  1.110  -2.21  0.90  2.69
(-0.16)  (2.21)  (4.97)  (7.21)  --(0.63)  (-0.45)
Chilo  -79.48  1.627  2.15U  1.582  2.626  3.01  0.95
(-4.68)  (4.48)  (5.17)  (8.36)  (0.68)  (0.61)
Colombia  22.45  0.123  0.704  0.624  -0.023  -1.69  0.69  2.30
(0.76)  (1.18)  (2.20)  (1.47)  (-0.14)  (-1.42)
Uruguay  -20.58  0.486  0.508  0.66  1.7n2  -0.363  0.69  2.18
*  (0.72)  (1.82)  (2.13)  (2.91)  (2.40)  (-0.29)
o
A.  Skilled  Labor
Cotant  LC  I  N  W  IU(-l)  R2 DW  (h)
ArgutO  na  21.19  0.178  0.127  -1.23  -0.94  0.64  -0.74  0.94
(0.-9)  (1.47)  (1.40)  (0.72) (-1.59)  (6.89)  (-0.97)
Chile  25.24  0.51  0.J88  0.811  -5.967  -0.267  -0.40  0.n7
(0.28)  (1.09)  (5.06)  (0.09) (-1.91)  (0.65)  (0.47)
Colombia  -8.965  0.561  -0.687  1.624  1.180  -0.796  0.66  0.48
(-0.16)  (0.91)  (-0.45)  (0.572)  (0.67)  (-1.38)  (-1.47)
Uruguay  -10.44  0.367  0.321  0.196  -2.875  -0.494  8.167  0.46
(-0.96)  (0.57)  (1.42)  (0.67)  (-0.61)  (-1.45)  (0.29)
0.91nittons:
2CPI  Inflation
-.  a  *=ITable 5t
Price  of  Nontradabies:  the  Effoct  of  Segmentation
(2SLS - unrestrictod)
Constant  PT  wU  LC  w  I  Yd  PT(W/Wu)  PT(S/W9)  R 2 ow
Argentina  -15.69  0.109  -0.902  0.239  -0.220  0.621  0.697  0.99  1.97
(-0.57)  (1.61)  (-0.45)  (3.24)---  (-1.54)  (0.60)  (2.69)
-14.16  0076  -0.176  0.237  -0.194  0.5S1  O.5S  0.122(-1)  0.99  1.68
(-0.56)  (1.-N)  (-0.91)  (4.16)  (1.49)  (0.45)  (8.11)  (2.90)
-17.94  0.061  -0.144  0.20  40.191  0.6e8  (0.56)  0.115(-1)  0.99  1.52
(-0.70)  (1.46)  (-0.75)  (4.06)  (-1.45)  (0.86)  (2.96)  (2.96)
Chi I  -8.48  0.876  0.196  0.084  0.1S.  0.020  0.208  0.99  2.64
(40.49)  (12.06)  (2.40)  (1.88)  (6.19)  (0.43)  (4.91)
P4  -2.17  0.166  0.804  0.022  0.187  -0.084  0.166  0.209  0.99  2.45
(-0.82)  (1.67)  (2.72)  (0.79)  (2.73)  (-0.067  (8.64)  (1.88)
-5.59  0.466  0.168  0.045  0.132  0.186  0.214  -0.068  0.99  2.29
0.66)  (2.71)  (1.55)  (1.27)  (5.01)  (0.29)  (4.49)  (-0.54)
Cle.bla  20.64  0.270  0.218  0.071  0.01  -1.876  0.2e0  0.09  1.77
(1.29)  (8.57)  (2.14)  (1.76)  (1.25)  (-1.61)  (1.5)
16.96  0.292  0.216  0.048  0.077  -1.106  0.289  0.064  0.91  1.56
(0.97)  (8.77)  (2.15)  (1.84)  (1.5U)  (-1.26)  (1.26)  (1.58)
15.67  0.426  0.166  0.101  0.080  -1.111  0.284  -0.161(-I)  0.92  1.96
(1.02)  (2.36)  (1.67)  (1.96)  (0.57)  (-1.86)  (1.83)  (-1.28)
Ur gem  10.62  0.770  0.016  -0.245  0.027  0.78  o. so  o.CS  1.42
(1.09)  (1.46)  (0.19)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (-1.47)  (8.18)
-2.1  0.991  0.222  0.026  -0.829  -0.418  0.985  0.387  0.96  1.48
(0.11)  (1.76)  (0.75)  (0.19)  -0.67)  (-1.44)  (8.04)  (0.77)
21.61  0.487  -0.014  O.OU6  -0.151  -0.651  0.720  0.480  0.96  1.54
(1.63)  (0.64)  (0.42)  (-04.0)  (-1.57)  (2.41)  (0.65)PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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